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In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the United States Supreme Court
augmented the existing framework for establishing employer liability in dispa-
rate treatment discrimination claims. This decision recognized the shortcom-
ings of pretext analysis as outlined in McDonnell Douglas v. Green and
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, and enundated
mixed-motives analysis which enables plaintiffs to hold employers liable
whenever an illegitimate criterion, such as race, sex, or national origin, is a
motivating factor in an adverse employment decision. liewed as a comple-
ment to pretext analysis, mixed-motives analysis aimed to fill gaps in availa-
ble disparate treatment theories, and it also potentially leveled the playing
field by providing a mechanism that allowed plaintiffs to shift the burden of
persuasion to defendants. However, without explicit instructions from the
t BA., Cornell University 1998; candidate forJ.D., Comell Law School, 2001.
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Court as to what constitutes direct evidence of discriminatory animus, the
circuit courts have applied different standards for analyzing mixed-motives
discrimination claims. The courts continue to struggle with the direct evi-
dence requirement today and have adopted stringent interpretations of this
requirement, thus denying the benefit of mixed-motives analysis to plaintiffs
with arguably meritorious claims.
This Note points to research in cognitive psychology which shows that
discrimination in today's workplace is more subtle and complex than tradi-
tional intent-based models of employment discrimination recognize. The au-
thor argues that a framework of mixed-motives discrimination that focuses
on the nature and extent of employer liability, rather than on the definition
of discriminatory animus, better furthers the goals of Title VII. Taking gui-
dance from the Supreme Court's most recent decisions in Title VII juispru-
dence which focused on workplace harassment, the author proposes a
framework for mixed-motives analysis that is injury-based and fact-intensive
and also takes into consideration economically efficient and socially desirable
allocations of the burden of persuasion in employment discrimination cases.
INTRODUCrION
More than ten years after the Supreme Court's decision in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins,1 the federal courts continue to struggle with
mixed-motives discrimination claims. The source of the confusion
and the inconsistent adjudications lies in the "direct evidence" re-
quirement,2 the necessary threshold for triggering mixed-motives
1 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). The Civil Rights Act of 1991,
Pub. L. No. 102-166, sec. 107(a)-(b), § 703, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075-76 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (1994)), modified the liability component of
the Price Waterhouse decision so that when a plaintiff demonstrates that "race, color, relig-
ion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice," 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(m) (1994), the court "may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief .... and
attorney's fees and costs," id. § 2000e-5(g) (2) (B) (i), even when the employer demonstrates
"that [it] would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating
factor," id. § 2000e-5(g) (2) (B). For a discussion of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, see infra
Part I.C.
2 Ambiguity in the Price Waterhouse opinion as to the proper application of the mixed-
motives analysis has produced considerable confusion among the federal appellate courts.
Some courts require a strict traditional definition of direct evidence, while others adopt
other restrictive standards. E.g., Taylor v. Va. Union Univ., 193 F.3d 219, 232 (4th Cir.
1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1243 (2000) (applying a restrictive but nontraditional stan-
dard of direct evidence); Breeding v. ArthurJ. Gallagher & Co., 164 F.3d 1151, 1156-57
(8th Cir. 1999) (same); Mooney v. Aramco Servs. Co., 54 F.3d 1207, 1217 (5th Cir, 1995)
(applying the strict traditional definition of direct evidence, which requires evidence that
proves discriminatory animus without inference or presumption); Manzer v. Diamond
Shamrock Chems. Co., 1994 FED App. 0255P (6th Cir.), 29 F.3d 1078, 1081 (same); Ram-
sey v. City & County of Denver, 907 F.2d 1004, 1008 (10th Cir. 1990) (same); Jackson v.
Harvard Univ., 900 F.2d 464, 467 (1st Cir. 1990) (same); see also, e.g., Wright v. Southland
Corp., 187 F.3d 1287, 1293 (lth Cir. 1999) (articulating a new standard for the direct
evidence requirement after concluding that the "indiscriminate use of the term 'direct
evidence'" resulted in "substantial confusion in the district courts in [the Eleventh Cir-
cuit]"). Although the Eleventh Circuit attempted to clarify the definition of direct evi-
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analysis set by Justice O'Connor in her Price Waterhouse concurrence.3
Several commentators, recognizing the lack of uniformity among
lower courts and the absence of guidance from the Supreme Court,
have suggested their own views regarding direct evidence of discrimi-
natory animus.4 Nonetheless, the approaches suggested thus far do
not adequately address the complex and subtle forms of discrimina-
tion that infect today's workplace, as revealed by recent research in
the field of social psychology and work by other legal scholars, Re-
cent Supreme Court jurisprudence in employer sexual harassment
cases,6 however, provides suggestions for a workable approach to in-
tentional discrimination under Tide VII.
Over the past three decades, the Supreme Court has articulated
two primary theories of employment discrimination to analyze "dispa-
rate treatment" claims.7 The first is the pretext analysis outlined in
dence in a thorough opinion by Judge Tjoflat, "the end result is that the issue is now
confused even more." Peter Reed Corbin & John E. Du-all, Emploment Discrimination, 51
IMRcERL REv. 1123, 1126 (2000).
3 See Price Waterliouse, 490 U.S. at 276 (O'Connor, J., concurring injudgment).
4 E.g, Steven M. Tindall, Note, Do as She Does, Not as Size Says: The Shortcomings of
Justice O'Connor's Direct Evidence Requirement in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 17 BE.RKELEJ.
EMiP. & LAB. 1- 332, 337 (1996) (proposing that the probative value of the evidence rather
than the type should trigger analysis and suggesting that courts require only enough evi-
dence to reasonably allow a jury to conclude that unlawful discrimination motivated the
adverse employment decision); Joseph J. Ward, Note, A Callfor Price Waterhouse 11: "Te
Legacy ofJustice O'Connor's Direct Evidence Requirement for Mixed-Mothe Emplopment Discrimina.
tion Claims, 61 ALB. L. Rv. 627, 629 (1997) (arguing that courts should apply the direct
evidence requirement strictly, "much like Justice O'Connor's application in her PAice
Waterhouse concurrence"); Michael A. Zubrensky, Note, Despite the Smohe, There Is No Gun:
Direct Evidence Requirements in Mixed-Motives Employment Law After Price Waterhouse v. Hop-
kins, 46 STAN. L REv. 959, 980-84 (1994) (arguing that mixed-motives analysis should not
hinge on evidentiary requirements or distinctions, but rather on "prudential, precedential,
and policy concerns").
5 See, e.g., Jane Byeff Korn, Institutional Sexi6m: Responsibiliy and Intent, 4 TFx. J. WAo.
iszN & L 83, 86 (1995) (arguing against a model of discrimination based on individual
intent because "most discrimination today is the result of group effort"); Linda Hamilton
Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal
Employment Opportuniy, 47 STAN. L RPv. 1161, 1161-66 (1995) (appl)ing the insights of
cognitive psychology to disparate treatment theory and arguing that current theory is inad-
equate because it assumes that discrimination is motivational, rather than cognitive, in
origin); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection: Pirconing utith Uncon-
scious Racism, 39 STAN. L REv. 317, 318-28 (1987) (using cognitive psychology, among
other theories, to undermine an intent-based model of racial discrimination): Michael
Selmi, Response to Professor Wax, Discrimination as Accident: Old 111ine, New Bottle, 74 IND. L.J.
1233, 1233-35 (1999) (criticizing the notion that society should ignore unconscious or
"subtle" discrimination); Amy I Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129, 1130-34
(1999) (examining "unconscious disparate treatment" and arguing against extension of
the existing framework of antidiscrimination law to cover unconscious discrimination).
6 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth,
524 U.S. 742 (1998).
7 Disparate treatment doctrine applies when employers intentionally discriminated
against employees orjob applicants because of their membership in a protected class. S-e
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800-01 (1973).
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McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green? and later elaborated upon in Texas
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,9 which implements a three-
step, burden-shifting approach for establishing disparate treatment li-
ability.10 Second, in 1989, the Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins decision es-
tablished the analytical framework for "mixed-motives" discrimination
cases." This groundbrealdng decision recognized the shortcomings
of the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine pretext analysis by providing a frame-
work for analyzing situations in which adverse employment actions
were motivated by both legitimate and illegitimate reasons. Federal
courts, however, have had difficulty determining what properly consti-
tutes direct evidence of discriminatory animus, the necessary thresh-
old for shifting the burden of persuasion from the plaintiff to the
employer in mixed-motives claims. Circuit courts have generally split
in their approach to the direct evidence requirement along three dif-
ferent lines. 12
The importance of the development of mixed-motives analysis to
plaintiffs in proving intentional discrimination cannot be overstated.
First, the mixed-motives analysis fills gaps in the available theories of
employment discrimination.1 3 Second, it potentially levels the decid-
edly pro-defendant field of litigation by providing a mechanism that
allows plaintiffs to shift the burden of persuasion to defendants. 14
Prior to Price Waterhouse, disparate treatment doctrine assumed
that a single reason motivated the employer in an alleged discrimina-
tory action. 15 The plaintiffs task involved convincing the trier of fact
that the employer's proffered reason was pretextual-not the true rea-
son for the adverse employment action. 16 Even if the plaintiff accom-
plished this task, the plaintiff had the additional burden of proving
that "discrimination was the real reason"17 underlying the employer's
decision, essentially requiring the plaintiff to prove unstated reasons
8 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
9 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
10 Id. at 252-56; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 800-02.
11 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239-58 (1989) (plurality opinion). This
theory of liability allows a plaintiff to prove that discrimination motivated the adverse em-
ployment decision even if the employer also had a legitimate motive. See id. at 247 (plural-
ity opinion).
12 Tindall, supra note 4, at 354-56 (noting that courts can be divided into the follow-
ing categories: those that apply the traditional definition of direct evidence, those that
apply a restrictive standard, and those that apply a broad probative standard); Zubrensky,
supra note 4, at 970-78 (discussing three different interpretations adopted by the courts in
applying the direct evidence requirement); see also infra Part II.A (discussing different ap-
proaches to the direct evidence requirement among the federal circuit courts).
13 See Price Waterhouse; 490 U.S. at 247 (plurality opinion).
14 See id. at 258 (plurality opinion).
15 See, e.g., Burdine; 450 U.S. at 254-56; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804.
16 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
17 St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993).
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for the employment action. The mixed-motives analysis, however, rec-
ognizes that employers often base their decisions on both legitimate
and illegitimate reasons.18 Thus, it allows the plaintiff's claim to pro-
ceed when the plaintiff can show that an impermissible bias played a
role in the employment decision.19 Furthermore, once the plaintiff
establishes a causal connection between the illegitimate bias and the
employment decision, the burden of persuasion shifts to the employer
to prove that it would have reached the same decision notwithstand-
ing the impermissible factor.20
The full potential of mixed-motives analysis to advance the goals
of Title VII remains unrealized, however, because courts21 continue to
use a model of intentional discrimination that no longer adequately
addresses the complex and subtle forms of discrimination in today's
workplace. 22
Part I of this Note reviews the importance of mixed-motives analy-
sis within the framework of employment discrimination jurispru-
dence. Part II examines the recent wave of federal case law struggling
with the direct evidence requirement. It also reviews the direct evi-
dence requirement in light of cognitive psychology research and
other scholarship that calls into question the overemphasis on intent
in employment discrimination jurisprudence. In Part MI, this Note
discusses the concerns involved in setting a threshold that adequately
separates legitimate discrimination claims from meritless and frivo-
lous claims. Part IV proposes a workable approach to the direct evi-
dence requirement that focuses not on the definition of what
constitutes discriminatory animus but rather on outlining the nature
and extent of employer liability in furthering the goals of Title VII, as
the Supreme Court has done in recent workplace harassment
decisions.
18 See Prce Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 247, 250 (plurality opinion).
19 Id. at 258 (plurality opinion).
20 Id. (plurality opinion).
21 See, e.g., Hicks; 509 U.S. at 516-17 (indicating that the plaintiff has "'the ultimate
burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination'"
(emphasis added) (quoting Burdin 450 U.S. at 256)); Warren v. Halstead Indus., 802 F.2d
746, 752-53 (4th Cir. 1986) (placing burden on the plaintiff to show that "the defendant's
proffered reason is not worthy of belief or that discriminatory reasons more likely moti-
vated the defendant"); Smith v. Honeywell, Inc., 735 F.2d 1067, 1068-69 (8th Cir. 1984)
(noting that plaintiffs alleging disparate treatment have the burden of showing not only a
difference in treatment but also that they are victims of intentional discrimination).
22 Krieger, supra note 5, at 1164-65; see also id. at 1199-1217 (applying cognitive psy-
chology to undermine the notion of intent-based employment discrimination); Larence,
supra note 5, at 322 ("[A] large part of the behavior that produces racial discrimination is
influenced by unconscious racial motivation."); cf. John A. Bargh, Conditional Autonatidtl:
Varieties of Automatic Influence in Sodal Perception and Cognition, in UNINTE-NDED TnoUtrrH 3,
3 (James S. Uleman &John A. Bargh eds., 1989) ("An automatic thought process [is] one
that is capable of occurring without the need for any intention that it occur, without any
awareness of the initiation .... ).
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I
BACKGROUND ON MIXED-Mom'Es ANALYSIS IN EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION JURISPRUDENCE
A. Pretext Analysis
Prior to the development of the mixed-motives analysis outlined
in Price Waterhouse, plaintiffs alleging disparate treatment in the work-
place proceeded under the three-step, burden-shifting approach for
proving intentional discrimination first enunciated by the Supreme
Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green23 and later elaborated upon
in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine.24 The first step re-
quires the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of discrimination by
showing that: (1) the plaintiff belonged to a protected class; (2) the
plaintiff applied for a job for which he or she was qualified; (3) the
plaintiff was rejected; and (4) the position remained open and the
employer continued to seek applicants with similar qualifications. 2 A
properly established prima facie case creates a rebuttable presump-
tion of discrimination. 26
The burden then "shift[s] to the employer to articulate some le-
gitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the [plaintiffs] rejection," in
the second step of the analysis. 27 If the employer simply articulates a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action, then the employer
satisfies the burden of production 28 necessary to rebut the presump-
tion of discrimination raised in the first step. 29 In the third step of the
analysis the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate
that the employer's proffered reason is pretextual and "not the true
reason" for the employment action.3 0 The plaintiff meets this burden
of persuasion by proving that the "presumptively valid reasons for [the
adverse employment action] were in fact a coverup" for
discrimination.3'
The first two steps of the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine analysis essen-
tially serve as little more than mere formalities. The first step, the
plaintiff's demonstration of a prima facie case, requires only minimal
23 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
24 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
25 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
26 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
27 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
28 Burdine made clear that the employer's burden here is merely one of production,
requiring the employer to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for an adverse employ-
ment action. 450 U.S. at 254-55. The employer "need not persuade the court that it was
actually motivated by the proffered reasons." Id. at 254.
29 Id. at 255.
30 Id. at 256.
31 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 805.
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proof of discrimination.3 2 To satisfy the second step, the employer
"'need only articulate-not prove-'" a nondiscriminatory reason for
its actions.3 3 The employer does not need to persuade the trier of fact
that its proffered reason actually motivated the employment deci-
sion.3 Thus, under the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine approach, the ulti-
mate burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff, and the critical
step lies in the pretext analysis. The plaintiff, in order to prevail
under the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework, must demonstrate
that the employer's articulated nondiscriminatory reason was in fact
false.35
In St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,3 6 the Supreme Court further
increased the plaintiff's burden of persuasion by holding that proof of
pretext alone does not compel a finding in favor of the plaintiff?37 In
addition to demonstrating pretext, Hicks requires the plaintiff to
prove that discrimination was the real reason for the employment ac-
tion.38 This additional burden essentially requires the plaintiff to
prove unstated reasons for the employment action, which is "a formi-
dable and impractical burden upon plaintiffs bringing disparate treat-
ment lawsuits."3 9
B. Mixed-Motives Analysis
In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court recognized the inade-
quacy of the pretext analysis as a framework for disparate treatment
claims.40 The inadequacy is readily apparent in claims in which both
permissible and impermissible motives prompted the employment ac-
tion. The facts of Price Waterhouse perfectly demonstrate the need for
a mixed-motives analysis in addition to the pretext analysis of dispa-
rate treatment discrimination. 41
In that case, Price Waterhouse, an accounting firm, denied Ann
Hopkins partnership despite her "key role in Price Waterhouse's suc-
32 SeeFisherv. Vassar Coll., 114F.3d 1332, 1337 (2d Cir. 1997) (enbanc) (stating that
"virtually any [employment] decision... will support a slew of prima fade cases of discrim-
ination [under McDonnell Douglas]"), abrogated on other grounds bO" Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133 (2000); cf U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors %. Aikens, 460
U.S. 711, 715 (1983) (explaining that "[t]he prima fade case method established in Mc-
Donnell Douglas was 'never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic'" (quoting
Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978))).
33 450 U.S. at 258 (quoting Turner v. Tex. Instruments, Inc., 555 F.2d 1251, 1255 (5th
Cir. 1971)).
34 Id. at 254.
35 Id at 256.
36 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
37 Id. at 508-12.
38 Id. at 508.
39 Zubrensky, supra note 4, at 964.
40 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241-47 (1989) (plurality opinion).
41 See id. at 233-38 (plurality opinion).
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cessful effort to win a multi-million dollar contract with the Depart-
ment of State."42 Although Price Waterhouse's decision to deny
Hopkins partnership status was informed by legitimate concerns
about Hopkins's impatience and abrasiveness with staff,43 some of
those who decided not to promote her also considered illegitimate
gender stereotypes in their decision. 44 For example, one evaluator
advised Hopkins that if she wanted to improve her chances for part-
nership, she should "walk more femininely, talk more femininely,
dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear
jewelry."45 Even Hopkins's supporters evaluated her stereotypically,
one commenting that she "'ha[d] matured from a tough-talldng
somewhat masculine hard-nosed [manager] to an authoritative, formi-
dable, but much more appealing lady [partner] candidate.' ' 46
Thus, in this mixed-motives situation, Hopkins could not prevail
under the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine approach because she could not
show that her employer's concern about her interpersonal skills was
pretextual.47 In other words, Hopkins could not disprove all of Price
Waterhouse's justifications for its decision because in denying her the
partnership Price Waterhouse considered both legitimate and illegiti-
mate reasons. To fill this gap in disparate treatment doctrine, the
Court for the first time applied mixed-motives analysis to an employ-
ment discrimination claim.
Under the Court's analysis, the plaintiff must initially prove that
discriminatory animus played a motivating role in the adverse employ-
ment action.46 If the plaintiff is successful, the employer can avoid
liability only by proving that it would have made the same decision in
the absence of the illegitimate criterion. 49 Applying this analysis to
Hopkins's claim of discrimination, the Court found that the evidence
established that gender stereotypes did play a motivating role in Price
Waterhouse's decision to deny her partnership.50 Although Price
Waterhouse advanced some legitimate reasons for its decision, the
Court remanded the case to "determine whether Price Waterhouse
had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have placed
42 Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1112 (D.D.C. 1985), affd in rde-
vant par 825 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev'ad 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
43 There were numerous complaints about her inability to work with and get along
with others, and both her supporters and opponents described Hopkins as "overly aggres-
sive, unduly harsh, difficult to work with and impatient with staff." Id. at 1113.
44 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235 (plurality opinion).
45 Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. at 1117.
46 Price Waterhous 490 U.S. at 235 (plurality opinion) (first alteration in original)
(quoting one of Price Waterhouse's exhibits).
47 See id. at 246-47 (plurality opinion).
48 Id. at 258 (plurality opinion).
49 Id. (plurality opinion).
50 Id. at 255-58 (plurality opinion).
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Hopkins' [s] candidacy on hold even if it had not permitted sex-linked
evaluations to play a part in the decision-making process."5'
Price Waterhouse is significant not only because it provides a frame-
work that recognizes forms of employment discrimination, such as
mixed-motives claims, that are not viable under the traditional McDon-
nell Douglas-Burdine analysis, but also because it potentially affords
plaintiffs more favorable standards of liability.52 As discussed below, a
framework that allows plaintiffs favorable standards of liability is im-
portant in addressing employment discrimination in today's work-
place because of the difficulty in proving intent.53 However, the Price
Waterhouse analysis never realizes its potential for effectively addressing
the complex and subtle forms of modem employment discrimination
because of its misplaced focus on finding manifest discriminatory
animus. 54
C. Civil Rights Act of 1991
Under Price Waterhouse, employers could avoid liability by proving
that they would have made the same decision absent the illegitimate
motivating factor in the employment decision. 55 The Civil Rights Act
of 1991 codified the "motivating factor" test of Price Waterhous36 and
changed its liability component.5 7 Under the Act, so long as the plain-
tiff demonstrates that an impermissible criterion such as race or gen-
der was a motivating factor in the adverse employment decision,
liability attaches to the employer regardless of whether the employer
can satisfy the same-decision tesL58 That the employer can show that
it would have made the same decision without considering the imper-
missible motivating factor only limits its liability;5 9 it does not relieve
the employer of liability altogether.60 The plaintiff may still be enti-
tled to "declaratory relief, injunctive relief... , and attorney's fees."61
In sum, the employer becomes liable once the plaintiff establishes that
an illegitimate criterion entered into the decision-making process.
By codifying Price Waterhouse's motivating-factor test, the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 "clarifies that the burden shifts to the defendant
51 Id. at 254-55 (plurality opinion). On remand, the district court found that Price
Waterhouse failed to carry this burden and held for Hopkins. Hopkins v. Price
Waterhouse, 737 F. Supp. 1202, 1207 (D.D.C), affd 920 F.2d 967 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
52 See Fuller v. Phipps, 67 F.3d 1137, 1141 (4th Cir. 1995).
53 See infra Part II.B.
54 See infra notes 116-25 and accompanying texL
5 Price Waterlwuse 490 U.S. at 246 n.11 (plurality opinion).
56 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1994).
57 Id. § 2000e-5(g) (2) (B).
58 I& §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g) (2) (B).
59 IM § 2000e-5(g) (2) (B).
60 Id. § 2000e-5(g) (2) (B) (i).
61 Id
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once the plaintiff has established that sex [or another illegitimate cri-
terion] was a 'motivating' factor for any employment practice.""
More importantly, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 modifies the Price
Waterhouse holding that an employer could avoid liability completely
in mixed-motives cases by demonstrating that the same employment
action would have been taken absent the discriminatory motive.6 -
The fine point here is that Congress's enactment of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 illustrates its recognition that Title VII's goal of eliminat-
ing discrimination in the workplace is better served not by determin-
ing whether discriminatory animus was the but-for cause of an adverse
employment decision but rather by eliminating impermissible criteria
from the decision-making process.64
II
DIREcT EVIDENCE REQUIREMENT AS APPLIED TO
DISCRIMINATION IN TODAY'S WORKPLAcE
A. Direct Evidence Requirement and Its Application
Federal courts have struggled with the application of the mixed-
motives analysis ever since Price Waterhouse formulated it more than
ten years ago.65 In particular, the primary source of the confusion
among federal district and circuit courts has been the direct evidence
requirement, which Justice O'Connor set out in her Price Waterhouse
concurrence as a necessary threshold for triggering mixed-motives
analysis. 66 Justice O'Connor's failure to define clearly what consti-
tutes direct evidence has resulted in inconsistent and unjust adjudica-
tions of mixed-motives employment discrimination claims in the lower
courts.
For example, in Taylor v. Virginia Union University,67 the Fourth
Circuit affirmed summary judgment against plaintiff Lynne Taylor on
62 Margaret E. Johnson, Comment, A Unified Approach to Causation in Disparate Treat-
ment Cases: Using Sexual Harassment by Supervisors as the Causal Nexus for the Discriminatory
Motivating Factor in Mixed Motives Cases, 1993 Wis. L. REv. 231, 240; see also id. at 240-41
(discussing the Price Waterhouse analysis as clarified and changed by the Civil Rights Act of
1991).
63 Id. at 241.
64 See Kelley E. Dowd, Note, The Correct Application of the Evidentiay Standard in Title VI
Mixed-Motive Cases: Stacks v. Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages, Inc., 28 CGimrTON L. RExv.
1095, 1124 (1995) (explaining that Price Waterhousds same-decision test diluted the effec-
tiveness of Title VII as a deterrent to employment discrimination because it " 'permit[ted]
prohibited employment discrimination to escape sanction under Title VII'" (alterations in
the original) (quoting H.1L REP. 102-40(I), at 46 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549,
584)).
65 See supra notes 2, 12 and accompanying text.
66 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 276 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring
in judgment).
67 193 F.3d 219 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1243 (2000).
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her discrimination claims6 in the face of strong evidenceG9 that gen-
der stereotypes played a motivating role in the refusal to permit Tay%-
lor to attend the Police Academy.70 Taylor presented evidence that
Chief Wells, the decision maker, told Officer Terry that "he was never
going to send a female to the Academy."71 Consistent uith his prom-
ise, Wells did not send Taylor to attend the academy, "nor did he se-
lect any woman to attend the Academy during his tenure as Chief of
Police."72 Additionally, a fellow male officer "testified that Chief Wells
had once referred to Taylor as a 'stupid bitch,' and asked him if he
was sleeping with [another female candidate]."Ta
Despite evidence that clearly evinced Wells's discriminatory atti-
tude towards women in general and his attitude against sending them
to the Police Academy, the majority denied Taylor the benefit of the
mixed-motives standard of liability.74 The majority applied a standard
of direct evidence that requires "'evidence of conduct or statements
that both reflect directly the alleged discriminatory attitude and that
bear directly on the contested employment decision.'"7 According to
the majority, Chief Wells's statement to Officer Terry that "he was
never going to send a female to the Academy" was not "direct evi-
dence" for purposes of Taylor's claim because it lacked a sufficient
causal nexus with his decision not to send Taylor to the Academy.7 6
Although the Fourth Circuit recognized that under the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 an employer is liable so long as an impermissible criterion
was a motivating factor in an employment decision, the court's ap-
proach to the direct evidence requirement precluded successful appli-
cation of mixed-motives analysis in Taylor.77 This restrictive standard
contrasts sharply with Fourth Circuit precedent, wherein the court
"stated that to shift the burden of persuasion to the employer, a plain-
tiff need only 'prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the em-
68 Id. at 225.
69 See id. at 227.
70 Id. at 225. Virginia Union University (VUU) had the opportunity to send two of-
ficers each year to the Police Academy. Id. at 225 n.2. The criteria for selection were "(1)
seniority, (2) employment with VUU for more than ninety days; (3) experience; (4) inter-
est; (5) desire to attend the Police Academy; and (6) wvritten ew.luations." Id. Attending
the Police Academy "had a positive impact on promotional opportunities" for VUU's of-
ficers. I.
71 Id. at 227 (internal quotation marks omitted).
72 Id. at 244 (Murnaghan,J., dissenting). "Of the six male officers... selected for the
Academy while Taylor was employed by the police department, only three... were hired
before Taylor, three were selected for the Academy within twelve months of their date of
hire; and one was selected within four months of his date of hire." Id at 241 (Murnaghan,
J., dissenting).
73 Id. at 227 (quoting the joint appendix).
74 Id. at 232-33.
75 Id. at 232 (quoting Fuller v. Phipps, 67 F.3d 1137, 1142 (4th Cir. 1995)).
76 Id.
77 Se- i&.
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ployer's motive to discriminate was a substantial factor in the adverse
personnel action against the plaintiff.' 7 8
Even narrower than the approach adopted by the Fourth Circuit
and followed by the Second, Third, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits,7t9 is
the approach that adopts the traditional definition of direct evi-
dence.80 This high evidentiary standard views direct evidence as the
antonym of "circumstantial evidence," defining direct evidence as
"'evidence, which if believed, proves existence of fact in issue without
inference or presumption."'"" Commentators have previously identi-
fied the First, Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits as applying this tradi-
tional interpretation of the direct evidence requirement.8 2 Under this
approach, any evidence that requires the trier of fact to draw an infer-
ence to prove a causal relationship between the illegitimate criterion
and the employment decision would not qualify as direct evidence 18 3
Thus, to use an example illustrated by the Second Circuit, a "highly-
probative statement like 'You're fired, old man' still requires the
factfinder to draw the inference that the plaintiff's age had a causal
relationship to the decision."8 4 The court noted that this type of a
statement which speaks to a specific mental state is "usually impossible
to obtain," especially in today's workplace in which employers are
smart enough to know not to say such things even if they may think
them.815
Recognizing the inadequacy and injustice of these two standards
applied to mixed-motives discrimination claims, the Eleventh Circuit
78 Tindall, supra note 4, at 362-63 (quoting White v. Fed. Express Corp., 939 F.2d 157,
160 (4th Cir. 1991)).
79 According to commentators, the Second, Third, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have
interpreted direct evidence to mean evidence that reflects discriminatory animus and bears
directly on the employment decision at issue. See id. at 359; Zubrensky, supra note 4, at
976; see also, e.g., Breeding v. ArthurJ. Gallagher & Co., 164 F.3d 1151, 1156-57 (8th Cir,
1999) (applying a restrictive, but nontraditional, standard of direct evidence). Although
both commentators recognize the Fourth Circuit as using a nonrestrictive standard, see
Tindall, supra note 4, at 362-63; Zubrensky, supra note 4, at 971, the court's most recent
position on direct evidence as clarified in Taylor placed the Fourth Circuit in the group
applying a restrictive standard, see Taylor, 193 F.3d at 232-33.
80 Tindall, supra note 4, at 356; Zubrensky, supra note 4, at 973.
81 Wright v. Southland Corp., 187 F.3d 1287, 1293 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting BLAcX's
LAW DIGaoNARY 460 (6th ed. 1990)).
82 See Tindall, supra note 4, at 356; Zubrensky, supra note 4, at 973-74; see also, e.g.,
Mooney v. Aramco Servs. Co., 54 F.3d 1207, 1217 (5th Cir. 1995) (applying the strict, tradi-
tional definition of direct evidence, which requires evidence that proves discriminatory
animus without inference or presumption); Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co.,
1994 FED App. 0255P (6th Cir.), 29 F.3d 1078, 1081 (same); Ramsey v. City & County of
Denver, 907 F.2d 1004, 1008 (10th Cir. 1990) (same);Jackson v. Harvard Univ., 900 F.2d
464, 467 (1st Cir. 1990) (same).
83 Zubrensky, supra note 4, at 973.
84 Ostrowski v. Ad. Mut. Ins. Cos., 968 F.2d 171, 181 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting Tyler v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1185 (2d Cir. 1992)).
85 Id.
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recently articulated a new standard in Wright v. Southland Corp.8
Judge Tjoflat enunciated the "'preponderance' definition,"87 which
holds that, in the context of discrimination law, "direct evidence"
means "evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could find, by a
preponderance of the evidence, a causal link between an adverse em-
ployment action and a protected personal characteristic."8 He recog-
nized that the nature of discrimination suits presents difficult
evidentiary burdens for plaintiffs because it "puts the plaintiff in the
difficult position of having to prove the state of mind of the person
making the employment decision."8 9 Judge Tjoflat justified this pre-
ponderance definition by examining the structure and rationale of
employment discrimination jurisprudence in general.90 He explained:
[A] plaintiff in an employment discrimination suit may proceed by
one of two means: (1) McDonnellDouglas, or (2) direct evidence....
[T]he McDonnell Douglas presumption is merely an evidence-pro-
ducing mechanism that can aid the plaintiff in his ultimate task of
proving illegal discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence.
Consequently, if "direct evidence" is the alternative to using McDon-
nellDouglas, the term would seem necessarily to mean evidence suf-
ficient to prove, without the benefit of the McDonnell Douglas
presumption, that the defendant's decision was more probably than
not based on illegal discrimination.9'
Additionally, after examining fourteen prior Eleventh Circuit cases ad-
dressing direct evidence,Judge Tjoflat concluded that "[r ] egardless of
the stated definitions of direct evidence in these cases,... a look at
the actual holdings... reveals that they all rely on the preponderance
definition."92
The facts in Wright illustrate the need for another approach to
the direct evidence requirement. Plaintiff James Wright could not
present his case under the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine approach be-
cause "he could not prove that he was replaced by someone who dif-
fered in regard to the relevant personal characteristic (age)." 93
Rather, Wright's employer established that Wright was "replaced by
someone six months older than he [was]," thus rendering Wright in-
capable of establishing a prima facie case under the first step of Mc-
Donnell Douglas-Burdine framework. 94 However, Judge Tjoflat was not
persuaded by this fact because "it is both logically and practically pos-
86 187 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 1999).
87 Id. at 1294.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 1290.
90 Id. at 1293.
91 Id. (footnote omitted).
92 Id. at 1294.
93 i at 1303.
94 Id.
20011
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
sible for an employer to discriminate against a person on the basis of a
protected personal characteristic despite the fact that the person is
replaced by someone with the same characteristic." 95 Such a discrimi-
natory action would clearly violate Title VII, which makes unlawful any
employment decision in which impermissible criteria are a "motivat-
ing factor."96 If Wright could produce evidence that age was a moti-
vating factor in his termination, he should have been allowed to
proceed under the Price Waterhouse mixed-motives analysis, his only
other path for pursuing a disparate treatment claim. 97
However, when courts apply restrictive standards of direct evi-
dence, plaintiffs often have no recourse-even in situations where the
evidence suggests that an impermissible criterion played a role in the
employment decision. For example, the evidence presented at
Wright's trial clearly demonstrated that age was a factor in his termi-
nation.98 Shortly prior to his termination, a relevant decision maker,
Sharon Powell, had told Wright to consider quitting his job as a store
manager because she was concerned that he was too old to under-
stand the store's new computer programs. 99 In addition, the other
decision maker responsible for Wright's termination, Phil Tatum, in-
dicated to another employee that 'Wright was too old, and that he was
looking for younger store managers."'00 Nonetheless, the district
court, applying a restrictive definition of direct evidence, held that
Wright had failed to present direct evidence of age discrimination,
and granted summary judgment to the employer.' 0 ' Wright's evi-
dence, according to the court, was not direct evidence because it re-
quired the fact-finder to draw an inference to establish causation.1 02
In order to effectively implement the mixed-motives analysis in
accordance with congressional intent and other principles of employ-
ment discrimination law, Judge Tjoflat applied the newly enunciated
preponderance standard of direct evidence in vacating the district
court's judgment.10 3 Judge Tjoflat found that, although this evidence
did not establish conclusively the validity of the age discrimination
claim, it warranted mixed-motives analysis because "a jury could rea-
95 Id. at 1300.
96 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1994).
97 See Wright, 187 F.3d at 1301; see also Ward, supra note 4, at 645 (explaining that,
under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, "once the plaintiff shows that the illegitimate reason...
was a motivating factor in the employment decision, an irrebuttable liability attaches to the
defendant").
98 See Wright, 187 F.3d at 1303-04.
99 Id. at 1303.
100 Id. at 1304.
101 Id. at 1303.
102 Cf id. (indicating that the district court, applying "the dictionary definition of di-
rect evidence," held that plaintiff failed to present direct evidence).
103 See id. at 1305.
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sonably conclude [from this evidence] that, more probably than not,
age discrimination was the cause of Wright's termination."10 4 Accord-
ing to Judge Tjoflat, a genuine issue of material fact existed as to the
cause of Wright's termination, that could only be properly deter-
mined by a trial on the merits.105
Judge Tjoflat recognized that the question whether to proceed
under a Price Waterhouse mixed-motives analysis or a McDonnellDouglas-
Burdine pretext analysis should not depend on the type of evidence
that a plaintiff presents. 106 However, the root of the problem does
not lie in which definition of direct evidence the court decides to use.
Rather, this Note suggests that the more fundamental question is: as-
suming that the burden of persuasion should shift to the employer in
certain situations because it is difficult to prove intent in employment
discrimination, when should this occur? An examination of the
problems that underlie the current framework of mixed-motives anal-
ysis will aid in addressing this question.
B. Misplaced Focus on Intent
Current approaches to mixed-motives analysis shift the burden of
persuasion to the employer when there is direct evidence that the em-
ployer intentionally used an impermissible criterion in an employ-
ment decision. The approaches vary only with respect to the
definition of direct evidence, with some courts favoring a traditional
definition of direct evidence requiring no inferences of causation to
be drawn,10 7 and others requiring the evidence to both reflect directly
on the alleged discriminatory attitude and bear directly on the con-
tested employment decision. 108 However, these approaches, while ar-
guably sufficient in addressing the deliberate discrimination of an
earlier time, are unable to correct the subtle, unconscious forms of
bias prevalent in the modern workplace.10 9
Linda Hamilton Krieger argues that current disparate treatment
jurisprudence, including mixed-motives analysis, is incapable of ade-
quately remedying discrimination because of its emphasis on discrimi-
nation that presumes intent or motive.110 Describing the view found
in both the plurality opinion and Justice O'Connor's concurrence in
Price Waterhouse, Erieger explains that "evidence that a decisionmaker
holds stereotyped views of the plaintiff's group is deemed evidentially
significant not in and of itself, but because it is assumed to betoken
104 Id. at 1304 (footnotes omitted).
105 I. at 1305.
106 See id. at 1301.
107 See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying teXt.
108 See supra note 79.
109 Krieger, supra note 5, at 1164.
110 I&
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discriminatory animus.""' In establishing a Title VII violation, "the
plaintiff must prove the connection between stereotyping and discrim-
inatory intent."112 However, social psychology studies show that a sig-
nificant proportion of modem employment discrimination stems
from social cognitive processes and is not motivational in origin. 113
This misplaced focus on manifest intent creates the evidentiary hur-
dles discussed above' 14 which temporarily foreclosed Taylor's sex dis-
crimination claim and prompted Judge Tjoflat to articulate a new
standard for direct evidence to salvage Wright's age discrimination
claim.115
Social cognition theory, developed by researchers in cognitive
psychology, provides an alternative explanation, one that does not as-
sume that conscious discriminatory intent necessarily motivates all, or
even most, employment decisions. 116 According to this theory, the
use of stereotypes or schemas facilitates memory input, storage, and
recall of information. 117 By "actively categorizing or coding... infor-
mation according to well-leamed conceptual schemas," people learn
and remember information. 118 Subsequent events that confirm ex-
isting schemas are stored and encoded into the corresponding
schema, or "'tagged' with a category label."119 Categorizing informa-
tion into schemas aids the retrieval of information from memory be-
cause the category label functions as a retrieval cue when recalling
specific events. 120 Thus, memory recall favors events that confirm
schematic expectancies over "expectancy-inconsistent information."' 21
Moreover, the bias for expected events extends beyond memory to
perceptive processes so that people generally attend more closely to
schema-confirming as opposed to expectancy-inconsistent informa-
tion.122 Thus, this bias for expected events selectively filters the "facts"
available to the decision maker, resulting in the distortion by "cogni-
tive process-based errors in perception and judgment" of "the ostensi-
bly objective data set upon which a decision is ultimately based."' 23
ll Id. at 1172.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 1216-17.
114 See supra notes 67-85 and accompanying text.
115 See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
116 See Krieger, supra note 5, at 1209.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 1211.
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Discrimination then does not necessarily occur at the "moment
of decision."124 Rather, "stereotypes, person prototypes, and other im-
plicit knowledge structures bias decisionmaking long before the 'mo-
ment of decision' upon which Price Waterlouse... focus[es] Title VII's
adjudicative attention."'2 Disparate treatment, therefore, is not nec-
essarily the result of deliberate discriminatory motive or intent.126
Scholars also recognize the difficulty of addressing the phenomenon
of unconscious discrimination. 127 For example, Krieger notes that
"[e]ven among the well-intentioned, social schemas such as stereo-
types, acting in concert with a variety of other judgment heuristics,
can be expected to bias intergroup perception and judgment." 28
Stereotyping is simply a natural part of human cognitive functioning
that utilizes a number of categorical structures and heuristics.129
In sum, intergroup discrimination can be cognitive as well as
motivational in origin. Further, as an essential part of effective cogni-
tive functioning, the cognitive processes which cause discrimination
occur without ordinary conscious self-awareness.' 30 The current
framework of disparate treatment analysis, premised as it is on the
assumption that discrimination necessarily manifests intent, is only ca-
pable of addressing conscious and deliberate discrimination.' 3 ' How-
ever, as discussed previously, proving such intent is particularly
difficult in employment-related disputes.'32 AsJudge Posner once ob-
served: "Proof of [intentional] discrimination is always difficult. De-
fendants of even minimal sophistication will neither admit
discriminatory animus nor leave a paper trail demonstrating it; and
because most employment decisions involve an element of discretion,
alternative hypotheses (including that of simple mistake) will alays
be possible and often plausible."1 3 3 The fundamental flaw in the cur-
rent model lies in its equating causation with intentionality.
124 I
125 Id.
126 See id.
127 ,g., Lawrence, supra note 5, at 322-26 (arguing against an intent-bascd model of
racial discrimination); Wax, supra note 5, at 1130-31 (focusing on "unconscious disparate
treatment" in the workplace).
128 Krieger, supra note 5, at 1211.
129 I.
130 See supra notes 116-23 and accompanying text; see also Lamrence, supra note 5, at
323 (arguing that cognitive psychology posits that culture transmits beliefs and preferences
to individual actors, and that because cultural messages "seem part of the individual's ra-
tional ordering of her perceptions of the world," individual actors arc "unuare... that
the ubiquitous presence of a cultural stereotype has influenced her perception that blacks
are lazy or unintelligent").
131 See supra notes 110-15 and accompanying text.
132 See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
133 See Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 697 (7th Cir. 1987).
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III
SEARCHING FOR A REASONABLE THRESHOLD FOR SHIFTING
THE BURDEN
Concurring in Price Waterhouse, Justice O'Connor determined that
a reasonable threshold for shifting the burden of persuasion to the
employer is to require direct evidence of discriminatory animus.'3 "
She stated that "[iv]hat is required is . .. direct evidence that deci-
sionmakers placed substantial negative reliance on an illegitimate cri-
terion in reaching their decision."135 Scholars and courts that do not
adopt the traditional definition of direct evidence 13 6 interpret Justice
O'Connor's standard to require that employer statements "(1) reflect
a bias against, or stereotypical attitudes about, the plaintiffs protected
class; and (2) are closely connected to the adverse employment action
at issue."'1 7 The logic for this high evidentiary threshold is that "when
there is direct evidence of intentional discrimination, as in Price
Waterhouse, it is logical to place a more demanding burden on the
defendant, one beyond mere production."13  By requiring both a
temporal and causal connection between the discriminatory state-
ment and the employment action at issue, the Court made intent the
focus of the analysis. 139 Therefore, manifest discriminatory intent is at
present the best indicator of a violation of Title VII.
However, as discussed above, a model of employment discrimina-
tion based on manifest intent is both underinclusive and hard to
prove.140 Thus, the focus on intent is misplaced.
A. Need for a New Focus
In her article, Professor Krieger suggests instead that the analysis
should focus on causation, that is "whether the applicant or em-
ployee's group status 'made a difference. ' 14 1 However, although she
believes that causation should not be equated with intentionality, Krie-
ger's proposal simply returns to the statutory language of § 703(m) of
Title VII,142 enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.143 Rather
than proposing an alternative analysis that would effectively identify
134 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 276 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring
in judgment).
135 Id. at 277 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
136 See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
137 Tindall, supra note 4, at 348.
138 Ward, supra note 4, at 645.
139 See Tindall, supra note 4, at 353.
140 See supra Part II.B.
141 Krieger, supra note 5, at 1242.
142 See id.
143 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, sec. 107(a), § 703, 105 Stat. 1071,
1075 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1994)).
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causation in employment actions, Krieger focuses her discussion
mainly on causation itself (i.e., the cognitive processes that enter into
decision making). 44 Simply focusing on causation alone runs into
the same problems with intent that her article identifies-namely,
that stereotyping is often so deeply integrated into cognitive processes
that its effect on the decision-making process is unnoticed. 4 7 Krie-
ger's article also suggests that a negligence approach to discrimina-
tion might better further the purposes of Title VII.14 6 Nonetheless,
she recognizes that "imposition of a duty of care without defining
what specific actions an employer should undertake to fulfill that duty
could prove counterproductive" because little information exists as to
how to reduce or control the various biases that affect modem deci-
sion making.147
In Wright, Judge Tjoflat proposed that there should only be one
inquiry: whether or not "a reasonable factfinder could find, by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, a causal link between an adverse employ-
ment action and a protected personal characteristic."148 In essence,
this simple approach collapses the two frameworks in disparate treat-
ment jurisprudence, pretext and mixed-motives analyses.' 49 Regard-
less of whether the plaintiff can establish a prima facie case under
McDonnell Douglas-Burdine pretext analysis, she still has the ultimate
burden of proving that the employment action was discriminatory.150
This approach also allows the court to examine all the evidence in
order to determine whether an impermissible criterion was a motiv-at-
ing factor, even when the plaintiff presents no evidence that fits the
traditional definition of direct evidence. 1-1 However, the preponder-
ance of the evidence threshold in mixed-motives cases essentially ne-
gates any favorable standard of liability that Price Waterhouse intended
to provide for plaintiffs. 15 2
An important rationale for shifting the burden of persuasion to
the employer is to compensate for the difficulty of proving discrimina-
tion in employment decisions in mixed-motives situations.' 53 This
144 Krieger, supra note 5, at 1211-17.
145 See id. at 1188.
146 Id. at 1245. Seegenera/y David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligna Dicrirination, 141
U. PA. L REv. 899 (1993) (advocating negligence approach to workplace discrimination).
147 Krieger, supra note 5, at 1247.
148 Wright v. Southland Corp., 187 F.3d 1287, 1294 (11th Cir. 1999).
149 See id. at 1293, 1302.
150 Id. at 1302.
151 See U
152 See id (explaining that "failure to establish the McDonndl Douglas presumption,
under the preponderance definition of direct evidence, means only that tie case will be
treated like any other civil case").
153 Cf supra notes 47-52 (discussing the Court's sensitivity to Ann Hopkins's difficult
task under traditional pretext analysis); Part II.B (discussing subtle forms of cognitive-
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plaintiff-friendly standard is important because employers are liable so
long as an impermissible criterion was a factor in an employment deci-
sion, even if other legitimate reasons were present. 54 This brings the
analysis back to the fundamental question posed by this Note: assum-
ing that the burden of persuasion should shift to the employer in cer-
tain situations because it is difficult to prove intent in employment
discrimination cases, when should this occur? This Note addresses
two concerns in an attempt to answer that question.
B. Equilibrium and Economics
The first concern in setting a reasonable threshold for shifting
the burden of persuasion is striking an effective equilibrium between
screening out meritless and frivolous claims and allowing plaintiffs
with legitimate claims the full recourse of the law.155 In setting a high
threshold for shifting the burden by requiring direct evidence, Justice
O'Connor tipped the balance in favor of screening out meritless and
frivolous claims. Her concurring opinion stated:
I believe there are significant differences between shifting the bur-
den of persuasion to the employer in a case resting purely on statis-
tical proof.., and shifting the burden of persuasion in a case like
this one, where an employee has demonstrated by direct evidence
that an illegitimate factor played a substantial role in a particular
employment decision. 156
In addition, Justice O'Connor also commented that "stray remarks in
the workplace, while perhaps probative of sexual harassment, cannot
justify requiring the employer to prove that its hiring or promotion
decisions were based on legitimate criteria.1 57 Furthermore, Justice
O'Connor would not allow "statements by nondecisionmakers, or
statements by decisionmakers unrelated to the decisional process it-
self' to shift the burden to the employer.158 Thus, for Justice
O'Connor, claims based primarily on statistical evidence, stray re-
marks, statements by nondecisionmakers, and statements unrelated to
the decisional process itself are insufficient to warrant shifting the bur-
den to the employer.15 9
based discrimination and the evidentiary hurdles that they present for disparate treatment
plaintiffs).
154 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1994).
155 See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 275-77 (1989) (O'Connor,J.,
concurring in judgment).
156 Id. at 275 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
157 Id. at 277 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (citation omitted).
158 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
159 See id. at 275-77 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
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Unfortunately, as social psychologists demonstrate, 160 and as the
above cases establish,161 Justice O'Connor erred too much on the side
of screening out meritless and frivolous claims because application of
the direct evidence requirement denies legal recourse to many legiti-
mate Title VII plaintiffs. One can sympathize withJustice O'Connor's
concern, however, in not wanting disparate treatment jurisprudence
to allow stray remarks in the workplace to be the basis for mixed-mo-
tives claims. While Title VII forbids discrimination based on an indi-
vidual's "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin" with respect to
the "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment," it dearly does
not prohibit discriminatory attitudes or prejudicial thoughts them-
selves.162 Only when those thoughts and attitudes constitute a "moti-
vating factor for any employment practice" may an employer be liable
under Title V].163
This Note submits that because Title VII prohibits discriminatory
acts, and not discriminatory thoughts, the proper framework for
mixed-motives analysis should be injury-based and fact-intensive, and
the threshold for burden-shifting should focus more on what hap-
pened and less on why or how it happened. Once courts properly
allocate the burdens of production and persuasion under this mixed-
motives fiamework, then the mechanics of the adversarial system can
sort out the "hows" and the "whys."
Second, probabilities of outcome and economic concerns influ-
ence the threshold at which the burden of persuasion shifts to the
defendant.' 64 Burdens may be "allocated in accordance with the base
rate prior probabilities assumed to be associated with various explana-
tory theories or classes of events."1 65 Additionally, burdens may be
assigned "as the result of a deliberate decision to allocate one rather
than another group of potential litigants the risks associated with fac-
tual indeterminacy." 66 Specifically, burdens may be seen as mecha-
nisms for assigning the risk of nonpersuasion to the group of
potential litigants which, as a class, is best positioned to bear it cost-
160 See supra Part II.B.
161 See supra Part IIA
162 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (1994).
163 Id. § 2000e-2(m).
164 See generally Thomas R Lee, Pleading and Proofi The Economics of Legal Burdens, 1997
BYU L REv. 1 (1997) (employing "economic anal)sis to provide a framework for, allocating
burdens of pleading and proof"); Linda Hamilton Kriegcr, The Burdas ofFEquality: Burdens
of Proof and Presumptions in Indian and American Chil loights Law, 47 At. J. Co.w. L 89
(1999) (analyzing how burdens of proof are allocated in Indian and Amcrican ciil rights
law).
165 Krieger, supra note 164, at 120-21.
166 I&
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effectively in view of its comparative economic advantages. 16 7 Admit-
tedly, these types of allocations could create a situation in which a
particular adverse act against a particular plaintiff might not be strictly
attributable to discrimination on a given occasion, but they may
achieve cost efficiency and an overall result in which potential litigants
"[are] wrongly denied judgments least often."' 68 Either this economic
theory of burden allocation or one based on probabilities of outcome
(or a combination of the two) could justify the law's departure from a
default rule that automatically assigns the burden of persuasion to the
plaintiff.
IV
FORMULATING A WoRuiLE APPROACH
The Supreme Court, in its most recent review of Title VII juris-
prudence, enunciated a framework for analyzing sexual harassment
claims that resolved inconsistency among lower courts and essentially
collapsed the "quid pro quo" 6 9 and "hostile work environment" 170
theories of sexual harassment. In Burlington Industries v. Ellertht" and
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,"72 the Court specifically addressed em-
ployer liability for sexual harassment by supervisors of subordinate
employees. 73 Courts have since applied these holdings in the context
of employer liability for racial harassment, 74 and commentators have
argued to extend them to other protected classifications under Title
VII.175 Some scholars have even argued that through these two deci-
sions, the Supreme Court has finally "merg[ed] analysis of [sexual
harassment law] with other claims of intentional discrimination."17t
167 Id. at 121; see also Lee, supra note 164, at 9 (advocating shifting the burden of plead.
ing to the defendant on the issue of business justification in Title VII employment discrimi.
nation suits, in order to "economize[ ] on direct expenditures on investigation and more
effectively narrow[ ] the scope of issues to which further direct costs must be devoted").
168 Krieger, supra note 164, at 120-21.
169 A quid pro quo claim for sexual harassment exists when ajob benefit or detriment
is conditioned on the granting or withholding of sexual favors. Burlington Indus. v. El-
lerth, 524 U.S. 742, 751 (1998).
170 Sexual harassment exists under a claim of hostile work environment when unwel-
come sexual conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of the
victim's employment and create a hostile or abusive working environment. Meritor Say.
Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
171 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
172 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
'73 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780, 807-08; Ellerti, 524 U.S. at 74647, 764-65.
174 E.g., Booker v. Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., 17 F. Supp. 2d 735 (M.D. Tenn. 1998) (ap-
plying Burlington and Faragher to a Title VII race discrimination case).
175 E.g., Rebecca Hanner White, There's Nothing Special About Sex: The Supreme Court
Mainstreams Sexual Harassment, 7 Wm. & MARY BiLu RTS. J. 725, 743 (1999) (arguing that
"liability principles developed in [Ellerth and Faragher] should apply to all discrimination
claims").
176 Id. at 730.
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Because sexual harassment "presupposes intentional conduct"71 7 and
this framework imputes that intent to the employer vicariously,178 the
framework provides important guidance in formulating a workable
approach to mixed-motives analysis that circumvents the focus on mo-
tive or intent.
A. Faragher and ElLerth
Prior to Faragher and Ellerth, the lower courts applied different
approaches to employer liability for quid pro quo and for sexual har-
assment claims based on hostile work environment.'7 9 Lower courts
imposed vicarious liability on the employer in quid pro quo claims but
not for hostile work environment claims. 180 Thus, it wvas important for
courts to distinguish between the two forms of sexual harassment.' 8'
In Faragher, the plaintiff advanced her claim under a theory of hostile
work environment'8 2 "because no tangible job benefits, nor threats to
deny those benefits, were at issue." 183 However, that distinction was
not always easy to achieve, as was the case in Ellerth. In that case, the
question presented to the Supreme Court was whether an employer
can be held vicariously liable for a supervisor's unfulfilled threats to
deny tangible job benefits to an employee if she refused to submit to
his sexual demands.'8 4 The Court instead deliberated on when an
employer would be liable for a hostile work environment created by its
supervisors.' 85
The Supreme Court, recognizing that the issue was not really
about attaching labels of sexual harassment, resolved both the Ellerth
and Faragher cases by setting a standard for employer liability that "re-
jected the categories 'quid pro quo' and 'hostile work environment' as
determinative." 86 Under the Court's holdings, "an employer always
will be vicariously liable when supervisory discrimination results in a
tangible job action."' 87 The Court defines "tangible employment ac-
tion" in Ellerth as one that "constitutes a significant change in employ-
ment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment
with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a sig-
nificant change in benefits."188 When a supervisor takes no tangible
177 ELerth, 524 U.S. at 756.
178 Id. at 765.
179 See id. at 752-53 (discussing the distinction and citing cases).
180 See White, supra note 175, at 740.
181 See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 753.
182 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780.
183 White, supra note 175, at 741.
184 E/Lerth, 524 U.S. at 753-54.
185 See E//erth, 524 U.S. at 754.
186 White, supra note 175, at 742.
187 Id.
188 E!/erth, 524 U.S. at 761.
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employment action, "an employer [still] will be vicariously liable for
supervisory discrimination that is sufficiently severe or pervasive so as
to alter the terms and conditions of employment."' 8 9 However, the
employer may assert an affirmative defense when no tangible employ-
ment action has occurred.19 0 Under this defense, the employer avoids
liability if he can prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, "(a) that
the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct
promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff
employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or
corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm
otherwise."19 1
Through this elegant framework, the Court is able to accomplish
two things. First, the Court provides a means of legal recourse to
those plaintiffs with legitimate claims of sexual harassment but with-
out proof of discriminatory intent. Second, the Court employs a sys-
tem of burden and duty allocations to minimize unjust adjudications
and to encourage conscientious Title VII compliance. For example,
the Court allows the employer to assert an affirmative defense only
"when no tangible employment action is taken," which may be the
case in many claims previously labeled "hostile work environment,"
but allows no affirmative defense when a tangible employment action
is taken, which may be the case in many claims previously labeled
"quid pro quo.'u9 2 The rationale is that a tangible employment action
can only result from action done in a supervisory capacity, whereas
supervisors or coworkers can create a hostile working environment. 1 3
Moreover, the nature of the affirmative defense encourages employers
to take preventive and prompt corrective measures, to implement pol-
icies against harassment, and to foster employee communication and
feedback to employers.' 9 4
B. Proposal for a Workable Approach
The following proposal outlines a workable approach to analyz-
ing mixed-motives claims. This approach consists of two separate
thresholds for shifting the burden of persuasion to the employer. The
first threshold is Justice O'Connor's direct evidence requirement
189 White, supra note 175, at 742.
190 Id.
191 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
192 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
193 See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762; White, supra note 175, at 748.
194 See Paul Buchanan & Courtney W. Wisivall, The Evolving Understanding of Workplace
Harassment and Employer Liability: Implications of Recent Supreme Court Decisions Under Title VI,
34 WAKE FoRasT L. REV. 55, 62-64 (1999) (discussing the precautions that the employers
take to forestall sexual harassment claims).
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from her concurrence in Price Waterhouse'95 as it is interpreted by a
majority of the circuit courts: statements made by decision makers
must "(1) reflect a bias against, or stereotypical attitudes about, the
plaintiff's protected class; and (2) [be] closely connected [either tem-
porally or logically] to the adverse employment decision at issue." 196
If a plaintiff presents such evidence bearing directly on the employ-
ment decision at issue, then the burden of persuasion shifts to the
employer to prove that the impermissible criterion played no part in
the decision. Second, the burden of persuasion also shifts to the em-
ployer if a plaintiff presents probative evidence of discriminatory ac-
tion: that is, evidence that gives an indication of bias or stereotyping
of the plaintiffs protected class such that a reasonable fact-finder
could find it to have had an effect on an evaluation of the plaintiff's
job performance or an employment decision. When the burden of
persuasion shifts under this second threshold, the employer can avoid
liability by either proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the
plaintiff's protected status was not a factor in the employment deci-
sion or by asserting an affirmative defense. No affirmative defense is
available if the direct evidence threshold is met.
The structure of the affirmative defense is similar to that outlined
in Faragher and Ellerth- it is available if (1) the employer exercised rea-
sonable care to prevent and correct promptly any discriminatory em-
ployment action, and (2) the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed
to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities made
available to him or her by the employer. 197 The first purpose of this
affirmative defense is to force employers to consciously take note of
employment discrimination and to actively prevent impermissible ster-
eotyping from entering into decision-making processes. The second
is to encourage employers to take remedial action once they identify
discriminatory action.
These two different thresholds correspond to two sets of mixed-
motives claims. Under the direct evidence threshold, because the evi-
dence of discriminatory animus bears directly on the employment de-
cision at issue, the probability that an impermissible criterion infected
the decision is high, and thus, the claim is unlikely to be meritless or
frivolous. For example, when Price Waterhouse refused to make Ann
Hopkins a partner at the firm, there was sufficient evidence to pass
the direct evidence threshold because Hopkins could demonstrate
that the decision makers at Price Waterhouse considered gender ste-
reotypes-including how she fit those stereotypes-when making
195 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 276 (1989) (O*Connor, J., concurring
in judgment).
196 Tindall, supra note 4, at 348.
197 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; E/etlh, 524 U.S. at 765.
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their decision regarding her partnership bid.'98 The fact that evi-
dence of discriminatory animus directly relates to the employment de-
cision at issue presents strong proof that the impermissible criterion
played a motivating role in the decision, thus warranting the shift of
the burden of persuasion to the employer. This direct evidence
threshold can be analogized to the "tangible employment action" re-
quirement in the Faragher-Ellerth framework, because it too is indica-
tive of a causal relationship between supervisory capacity and
discriminatory harm. Applying this standard, evidence of discrimina-
tory animus is overtly related to the employment decision, and no af-
firmative defense is available to the employer.
Under the probative evidence threshold, the causal relationship
between the discriminatory animus and the employment action is fur-
ther removed. For example, in Taylor v. Virginia Union University,1""
when Lynne Taylor alleged that her failure to be selected to attend
the Police Academy from Virginia Union University (VUU) was dis-
criminatory, the powerful evidence of discriminatory animus har-
bored by Chief Wells, the decision maker, would meet the probative
evidence threshold and shift the burden of persuasion to VUU.2'0
The employer then would have a choice of either proving by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that any discriminatory animus held by
Wells played no part in the decision regarding the Academy or assert-
ing an affirmative defense of proper remedial measures. Because the
evidence of discriminatory animus meets the probative evidence
threshold, the general character of Wells's discriminatory statements
(i.e., they were not specifically related to Taylor's inability to attend
the Academy) would not prevent this claim from reaching the jury, as
it did in the Fourth Circuit's decision.201
Furthermore, as discussed above, social cognition research dem-
onstrates that stereotyping and bias affect and influence judgment
and association of social groups rather unnoticeably.202 Thus, the
probative evidence standard more effectively encompasses cognitive-
based employment discrimination because it does not require that the
evidence establish a causal link between the discriminatory attitude
and the employment action. 20 3 This standard can be analogized to
the severe-and-pervasive requirement in the Faragher-Ellerth frame-
198 Pfice Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235-37 (plurality opinion).
199 193 F.3d 219 (4th Cir. 1999).
200 See id. at 227.
201 See supra notes 67-77 and accompanying text.
202 See supra Part II.B.
203 The capacity for plaintiffs to proceed in these circumstances is especially importnt
given that employers today "will neither admit discriminatory animus nor leave a paper
trail demonstrating it." Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 697 (7th Cir. 1987).
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work204 because determination of severity and pervasiveness does not
necessarily depend on the supervisory capacity of the harasser.
One may worry, as Justice O'Connor did, that stray remarks in the
workplace would allow plaintiffs to bring mixed-motives claims. How-
ever, research in social cognitive psychology suggests that when a deci-
sion maker in an evaluative role harbors bias or stereotyping against a
plaintiff's protected class, there is a high probability that the classifica-
tion may affect either the employment decision at issue or job per-
formance evaluations that subsequently influence the employment
decision. Moreover, the employer has an affirmative defense in these
circumstances, thus mitigating any unfairness in allowing plaintiffs to
proceed when there is a diminished causal link between discrimina-
tory animus and adverse employment action. For example, in Lynne
Taylor's situation, the employer, VUU, could have had antidiscrimina-
tion policies in place to make both decision makers and employees
aware of their responsibilities. Taylor, if suspecting gender discrimi-
nation by Wells, could have used the appropriate reporting mecha-
nism. In order to avoid liability in potential discrimination litigation,
VUU (or at least its legal counsel) would have taken steps to ensure
that VUU officers investigated Taylor's claim and took appropriate re-
medial measures. Thus, this dual standard framework with an affirma-
tive defense would allow VUU a mechanism to avoid liability, and it
would properly discourage discriminatory employment actions without
prohibiting discriminatory thoughts or stray remarks. As seen in
Faragher and Elle7th, this way of allocating burdens and duties to en-
courage prescriptive action by employers furthers the purpose of Title
VII.
CONCLUSION
As outlined in Price Waterhous4 the importance of the develop-
ment of the mixed-motives analysis to plaintiffs in proving intentional
discrimination cannot be overstated. The mixed-motives analysis fil-
led the gaps in the available theories of discrimination and provided a
mechanism that allowed the plaintiff to shift the burden of persuasion
to the defendant, a favorable result previously unavailable to plaintiffs
who could not demonstrate that discriminatory animus was the but-for
cause of an adverse employment action. However, the direct evidence
requirement as a threshold for the burden shift has led to confusion
and inconsistency in the federal courts and also to frustration of legiti-
mate discrimination claims.
In light of social psychology research, this Note concludes that
the focus of the mixed-motives analysis should shift from intent to in-
204 See supra note 189 and accompanying texL
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jury. In the Supreme Court's most recent articulation of Title VII ju-
risprudence, the Court similarly focused on the resultant tangible
employment action and allocated burdens and duties according to
whether the injury itself was indicative of discrimination. This Note's
proposal for a workable approach follows the Court's rationale and
purpose in furthering the goals of Title VII and adapts mixed-motives
analysis to the more subtle, and often unconscious, forms of discrimi-
nation that exist today.
